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Abstract
Secure Localization Topology and Methodology for a Dedicated Automated Highway
System
by
Bhaswati Deka, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. Ryan M. Gerdes
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
Localization of nodes is an important aspect in a vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET).
Research has been done on various localization methods. Some are more apt for a specific
purpose than others. To begin with, we give an overview of a vehicular ad-hoc network,
localization methods, and how they can be classified. The distance bounding and verifiable
trilateration are explained further with their corresponding algorithms and steps used for
localization. Distance bounding is a range-based distance estimation algorithm. Verifiable
trilateration is a popular geometric method of localization. A dedicated automated highway
infrastructure can use distance bounding and/or trilateration to localize an automated
vehicle on the highway. We describe a highway infrastructure for our analysis and test
how well each of the methods performs, according to a security measure defined as spoofing
probability. The spoofing probability is, simply put, the probability that a given point on the
highway will be successfully spoofed by an attacker that is located at any random position
along the highway. The spoofing probability depends on different quantities depending
on the method of localization used. We compare the distance bounding and trilateration
methods to a novel method using friendly jamming for localization. Friendly jamming works
by creating an interference around the region whenever communication takes place between
iv
a vehicle and a verifier (belonging to the highway infrastructure, which is involved in the
localization process using a given algorithm and method). In case of friendly jamming,
the spoofing probability depends both on the position and velocity of the attacker and
those of the target vehicle (which the attacker aims to spoof). This makes the spoofing
probability much less for friendly jamming. On the other hand, the distance bounding and
trilateration methods have spoofing probabilities depending only on their position. The
results are summarized at the end of the last chapter to give an idea about how the three
localization methods, i.e. distance bounding, verifiable trilateration, and friendly jamming,
compare against each other for a dedicated automated highway infrastructure.
We observe that the spoofing probability of the friendly jamming infrastructure is
less than 2% while the spoofing probabilities of distance bounding and trilateration are
25% and 11%, respectively. This means that the friendly jamming method is more secure
for the corresponding automated transportation system (ATS) infrastructure than distance
bounding and trilateration. However, one drawback of friendly jamming is that it has a high
standard deviation because the range of positions that are most vulnerable is high. Even
though the spoofing probability is much less, the friendly jamming method is vulnerable
to an attack over a large range of distances along the highway. This can be overcome by
defining a more robust infrastructure and using the infrastructure’s resources judiciously.
This can be the future scope of our research. Infrastructures that use the radio resources
in a cost effective manner to reduce the vulnerability of the friendly jamming method are a
promising choice for the localization of vehicles on an ATS highway.
(75 pages)
vPublic Abstract
Secure Localization Topology and Methodology for a Dedicated Automated Highway
System
by
Bhaswati Deka, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. Ryan M. Gerdes
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
In today’s fast-paced world, mobility is a very important factor in improving the quality
of living. The purpose of an automated transportation system (ATS) is to provide mobility
to one and all, irrespective of their capabilities. An ATS requires a lot of planning to
be efficient and safe for public use. One of the main aspects of safety is to determine
the location of the individual vehicles within the system and ensure that their location
is not posing any hazard to other vehicles in the system or any other entity outside the
system. The process of determining or verifying the position of a particular object in space
is called localization. In an automated driverless vehicle, localization not only needs to be
accurate but also secure. This is because an adversary may be able to use the position of
an automated vehicle for malicious activities and disrupt normal functioning of the system.
Therefore, it is not only important, but also necessary, to create a secure localization system
for any ATS. This is the motivation of our research on vehicular localization methodology
and topology. We compare two existing localization methods called distance bounding and
verifiable trilateration with a novel method using friendly jamming for the specific case of a
dedicated automated highway. A dedicated highway consists of lanes exclusively for use by
automated vehicles. Individual units belonging to the highway infrastructure called verifiers
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are placed on, or surrounding, the highway according to a planned scheme. These verifiers
securely implement the process of localization.
The introduction gives a brief account of ATS and its current relevance. We delve into
some theory related to localization, and in the later part of this section, the probability
theory required for our analysis is reviewed. Then we discuss the infrastructures on which
we study the effectiveness of the three methods mentioned earlier. Here, the focus is on
a dedicated automated highway infrastructure. After defining the infrastructures, we find
the segments of the highway that are prone to attacks and describe an approach based
on probability theory to analyse the vulnerability of a given infrastructure. The term
used for the measure that tells us about the security of a given infrastructure using a given
localization method is spoofing probability. In the corresponding chapter, the formulae used
to arrive at the expressions for spoofing probability are derived. The spoofing probability
plots are generated for each method under different circumstances and compared. Before we
explain spoofing probability, we have a chapter in which the novel idea of friendly jamming
and its application in an ATS is explained.
We observe that the spoofing probability of the friendly jamming infrastructure is much
less than that for distance bounding and trilateration. This means that the friendly jamming
method is more secure for the corresponding ATS infrastructure than distance bounding and
trilateration. However, one drawback of friendly jamming is that it is vulnerable to attack
over a large range of distances along the highway, even though the spoofing probability is
much less. This can be overcome by defining a more robust infrastructure and using the
infrastructure’s resources judiciously. Our research can be continued further along these
lines.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)
With the advent of computing and communications revolution, the idea of intelligent
transportation systems, previously known as intelligent vehicle highway systems, began dur-
ing the 1980s [1]. ITS can be defined as the application of advanced technologies to surface
transportation problems, including traffic and transportation management, travel demand
management, advanced public transportation management, electronic payment, commer-
cial vehicle operations, emergency services management, and advanced vehicle control and
safety systems. There are several promising uses of ITS, if implemented meticulously. ITS
can be used to enhance mobility of vehicles, thus decreasing traveling times; to reduce fuel
consumption and emissions, and instances of accidents caused by human error.
The promise of ITS has been recognized by organizations by creating avenues for re-
search and implementation of ITS. For instance, the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) provides support for research and development, architecture and standards devel-
opment, and field tests and model deployments in cooperation with the private sector [1,2].
The European Union has also taken initiatives to promote research and development in
ITS [3]. Similarly, in Asia and Australia, ITS have been implemented or proposed [4–6].
1.2 Automated Transportation System (ATS)
The concept of automated transportation system (ATS) has been extensively researched
in the recent years, and in some cases they have been implemented on a test-basis [7].
In an ATS, a vehicle is guided down the roadway with little or no human intervention,
combined with the sharing of traffic information and road conditions between vehicles and
a smart roadside infrastructure. Efficient and secure implementation of ATS would be able
2to optimize the usage of busy highways, and hence reduce traffic congestion; would make
the need for manual control obsolete, and hence encourage people incapable of driving a
vehicle to travel alone; would reduce emissions, fuel consumption, and injuries. In order to
utilize these benefits in a secure manner, localization of vehicles in a ATS system becomes
important.
There have been localization methods proposed for wireless sensor nodes. Distance
bounding and verifiable multilateration are a few of the common localization methods which
can be implemented in specific scenarios [8]. However, we must examine a secure localization
method before using it for a specific scenario. A localization method can be prone to a
number of attacks [9]. The distance bounding (DB) protocol, for instance, is prone to
sybil attack wherein an adversary can make a legitimate node appear to be in a false
location by stealing its identity and sending a response that causes a verifier to calculate
false localization information [10]. In case of multiple verifiers, a number of adversaries can
collude with each other to spoof a position for the legitimate vehicle. We examine which
positions of a legitimate vehicle can be spoofed by an adversary or colluding adversaries in
an infinite highway-line using solely DB and then using DB with trilateration.
1.3 Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are larger scale networks of sensor nodes capable of
sensing information from the environment, processing the sensed data, and transmitting it
to the remote locations [11]. WSNs are mostly used in low bandwidth and delay tolerant
applications. WSNs have several distinctive features such as unique network topology,
diverse applications, unique traffic characteristics, and severe resource constraints.
Components of a WSN include one or more base stations or sink nodes connected to
a large number of sensor nodes scattered in a physical space. The number of sensor nodes
differ according to application and can extend upto several thousands in a given network.
The sensor nodes can sense physical information, process crude information, and report
them to the sink. The sink, in turn, queries the sensor nodes for information. A typical
wireless sensor node consists of the following components: the sensor unit, the processing
3unit, the transmission unit, and the unit of energy control. Depending on the area of
application, it may also contain additional modules such as positioning system (e.g. GPS),
or an energy generating system (e.g. solar cells) [12,13].
1.4 Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs)
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) is a sub-category of ITS which are wireless com-
munication networks that provide interesting roadside services such as vehicular safety,
traffic congestion, alternate routes, estimated time to destination, and in general improves
the efficiency and safety on the road. Each vehicle in VANETs is equipped with a wire-
less on-board unit (OBU) that allows the vehicle to communicate with other vehicles or
with road side units (RSUs) through short-range wireless communication [14] . VANETs
involve two modes of communications: vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication and vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) communication. VANETs use the dedicated short-range communi-
cations (DSRC) standard capable of communicating within a range of 1000 m at typical
highway speeds. It provides seven 10 MHz channels at the 5.9 GHz licensed band for ITS
applications, with different channels designated for different applications [15].
VANETs are advantageous as compared to long-range wireless communication through
internet-based or cellular system-based services. Some of these advantages are: lower la-
tency due to direct comuinication, broader coverage, and no service fee. The advantages of
VANETs have elicited some research projects around the world, by governments (e.g. the ve-
hicle safety communications consortium in USA [16] and car-to-car communications consor-
tium in Europe [17]), academia (e.g. UCLA campus vehicular testbed and vehicular network-
ing systems research laboratory at UM-Dearborn) and industry (e.g. Probabilistic routing
for vehicular ad hoc network patented by Toyota [18] and European automobile compa-
nies, Audi, BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Renault, and Volkswagen, formed a car-to-car
communications consortium).
41.5 Challenges in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
There are certain challenges which need to be addressed in order to avail of the advan-
tages of VANETs. They can be broadly categorized as follows [15,19].
Authenticity/Integrity : VANET participants, OBU and RSU, need to check the authentic-
ity and integrity of the received messages. This helps preventing sybil attacks and falsifying
position information.
Privacy/Confidentiality : Privacy, on one hand, and the ability to trace the source of misbe-
having vehicles, on the other hand, are two contradicting issues. In particular, the privacy
preservation in VANETs should be conditional, where senders are anonymous to receivers
while traceable by the authority. With traceability, the authority can reveal the sender’s
identity of a message once a dispute occurs.
Information availability : A vehicle’s data should be available to all other vehicles around,
all the time. This requirement may consume network resources.
Short-term linkability : For privacy, an eavesdropper should not be able to link messages
from the same OBU in the long-term. However, some VANETs applications require that in
the short-term, a recipient be able to link two messages sent out by the same OBU.
Traceability and revocation: An authority should be able to trace an OBU that abuses the
system. Also, once a misbehaving OBU has been traced, the authority should be able to
revoke it in a timely manner. This prevents the misbehaving OBU from causing any further
damage.
Efficiency : OBUs must have resource-limited processors to make VANETs economically
viable. Therefore, the cryptography used in VANETs should incur limited computational
overhead.
5Chapter 2
Background
In a wireless sensor network (WSN), such as a vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET),
there are two types of sensor nodes involved during localization [9, 20].
Unknown node: The node whose position needs to be determined is called an unknown
node.
Anchor node: The node whose position is known and which helps in the localization process
is called an anchor node or beacon node.
Some of the localization methods have been discussed in the following sections.
2.1 Range-based Methods
In these type of methods, the range, i.e. the distance between the anchor node and
unknown node, is determined and then using this distance information from different anchor
nodes, the position of the unknown node is estimated. This is a fine-grained approach to
localization as it attempts to measure the exact distance between the unknown and anchor
node. Some popular methods of calculating the range are as follows.
2.1.1 Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
RSSI measures the power of the signal at the receiver [21]. Based on the known
transmit power, the effective propagation loss can be computed. Since a measurement of
signal strength provides a distance estimate between the transmitter and the reciever, the
transmitter must lie on a circle centered at the receiver. The power level at the receiver is
given by
Pr = Ptc1(
c2
d
)n, (2.1)
where Pt is the power level on which the message is sent and n, c1, c2 are constants related
6to physical environment, the antenna gains, and carriers wavelength, respectively. Since, Pr
and Pt can be measured, the distance d can be estimated from this formula. The method
by Viani et al. uses RSSI data collected from test objects placed at known locations [22]. A
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is trained to obtain the relationship between the test objects
position at each time instant and the signals received by the anchor nodes (quantified by the
RSSI). A system composed of N sensors located at positions (xn, yn);n = 1, ....., N and an
investigation domain of coordinates (x, y) is defined. The investigation domain is denoted by
ID =
−XD
2 ≤ x ≤ XD2 and YD2 ≤ y ≤ YD2 . The domain, ID is partitioned into a 2-dimensional
lattice of C squared cells centered at (xc, yc), c = 1, ...., C. The localization problem is recast
as the probability of the presence of an object in each cell starting from the knowledge of
the RSSI values of the whole set of N × (N − 1) node links. The problem solution is the
computation of the posteriori probability1 distribution at each time-instant. An RSSI-based
scheme can be obtained for VANETs using dedicated short-range-communication (DSRC)
protocol which uses the IEEE 802.11p standard to support low-latency vehicle-to-vehicle
and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications [23, 24]. The drawback of using RSSI is that
there are factors such as multipath fading, shadowing and non-line-of-sight errors which
need to be taken into account [25]. Also, the distance measurements can be noisy due
to limitations of the hardware. Mobility complicates the handling of noise, and in noisy
environments, measurements can be misconstrued as observed motion. Also, for vehicular
networks, this method may not be feasible because the effects of fading becomes prevalent
when mobility increases.
2.1.2 Time of Arrival (ToA) and Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA)
These are time-based methods which use the propagation-time of a signal to determine
the distance between nodes. The propagation-time can be directly translated into distance,
based on known signal propagation speed. If the signal propagates in time t from the target
transmitter to the receiver, then the receiver is at the range R given by R = c.t, where c
1Posteriori probability distribution is the distribution of an unknown quantity treated as a random
variable, conditional on the evidence obtained from an experiment or survey.
7is the speed of light. TOA allows the receiver node to know the distance of itself from the
transmitter node. If we use multiple receiver nodes, TDoA allows the system to determine
relative position of the transmitter node from the multiple receiver nodes by examining the
difference in time at which the signal arrives at each receiver node. Distance bounding is
a popular method that estimates distance based on ToA. We will discuss this approach
in details in the later sections of this chapter. The time-of-ight-based methods determine
distances by measuring the propagation delay of a signal, we require high-resolution time
measurements, accurate real-time clock synchronization between nodes, and line-of-sight-
propagation conditions. To keep an accurate real-time clock synchronization among mobile
nodes becomes diificult. Research has been done to make it more robust for mobile nodes
[26,27].
2.1.3 Angle of Arrival (AoA)
Angle of Arrival techniques estimate the desired target by measuring the angle at which
signals from several transmitters arrive at the receiver through the use of directive antennas
or antenna arrays [28, 29]. AoA techniques may introduce errors by multipath fading and
shadowing, the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) propagation and multiple-access interference. Re-
searchers are attempting to make this method more accurate by eliminating errors caused
by multipath propagation [30,31].
2.2 Range-free Methods
The range-free methods do not try to measure parameters that will enable them to
exactly calculate distances between nodes. They try to estimate the distance between
nodes using data based on network connectivity and map reading. Some of the methods
that follow this approach are MDS map, DV hop, SLAM, and cooperative localization
methods.
2.2.1 Multi-dimensional Scaling (MDS) Map
It determines the positions of nodes when a node is given only basic information (e.g. a
8node may be given information of the nodes which are within communication range of the
given node). If the distances between neighboring nodes can be measured, that information
can be easily incorporated into the method. MDS map is able to generate relative maps that
represent the relative positions of unknown nodes when there are no anchor nodes that have
known absolute coordinates. When the positions of a sufcient number of anchor nodes are
known, e.g. three anchors for 2-dimensional localization and four anchors for 3-dimensional,
MDS map then determines the absolute coordinates of all nodes in the network [32]. MDS
map has three steps.
Step I : Use an all-pairs shortest-paths algorithm to roughly estimate the distance between
each pair of unknown nodes with the available network connectivity information in the be-
ginning.
Step II : Use multi-dimensional scaling (MDS), a technique from mathematical psychology,
to derive node locations that fit those estimated distances.
Step III : Normalize the resulting coordinates to take into account any nodes whose posi-
tions are known [33].
The network is represented as an undirected graph with vertices and edges. The vertices
correspond to the anchor nodes. The localization is based on two methods.
Proximity-only : A node only has information about which nodes are its neighbors, by means
of some local communication channel such as radio or sound. But, a node does not know
how far away these neighbors are or in what direction they lie. Here the edges in the graph
correspond to the connectivity information with neighbouring nodes.
Proximity and distance: The proximity information is enhanced by knowledge of the dis-
tances, between neighboring nodes. Here the edges are associated with values corresponding
to the estimated distances. MDS map is advantageous if the number of anchor nodes in the
network are low. Even with low number of anchor nodes, MDS map is able to localize the
unknown nodes. However, MDS map does not work well on irregularly-shaped networks as
the inter-node distances vary to a large extent and hence the estimated inter-node distance
and the actual distance between two-nodes may have a large error.
92.2.2 Distance Vector (DV) Hop
This method assumes a heterogeneous network consisting of sensing and anchor nodes.
The anchor nodes flood their location throughout the network. When they cross a node
along the way, they increment a running hop-count. Unknown nodes calculate their position
based on the received anchor node locations, the hop-count from the corresponding anchor
node, and the average-distance per hop which is obtained through anchor to anchor com-
munication. The DV hop algorithm by Niculescu and Nath uses a distance vector exchange
such that the distances between nodes and landmarks are expressed in terms of hops [34].
Each node maintains a table [Xi;Yi;hi] and exchanges updates only with its neighbors.
Once a landmark gets distances to other landmarks, it estimates an average size for one
hop, which is then deployed as a correction to the entire network. An arbitrary node after
a correction may then have estimate distances to landmarks, in meters, which can be used
to perform triangulation [35].
2.2.3 Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM)
The localization problem of SLAM is posed in the following manner. “Is it possible
for an autonomous vehicle to start in an unknown location in an unknown environment
and then to incrementally build a map of this environment while simultaneously using this
map to compute absolute vehicle location [36]?” The autonomous vehicle which needs to
be localized first collects data using sensors, RADAR [37], GPS [37], or using methods like
dead-reckoning [38]. It then builds a map of the surrounding objects, and as more data is
received, the node optimizes its map using techniques like Kalman filters [39,40].
2.2.4 Cooperative Localization
The cooperative localization techniques depend on the knowledge of surrounding nodes
to relatively localize a node with respect to it’s neighbours. This method relies on algo-
rithms based on the principles of estimation theory and statistical inference [41–43]. These
techniques are useful when a node is not able to communicate with the verification infras-
tructure. By utilizing the localization knowledge of other nodes, a given node can have
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an acceptable estimation of its own location within the network. Sometimes cooperative
localization is used in conjunction with a range-based method as as time difference of arrival
or angle of arrival [28,29].
2.3 Geometric Methods
The range-based methods depend on geometric methods for the position determina-
tion aspect of localization. Hence, we analyze some of the popular geometric methods of
localization. After the anchor nodes estimate the distance of an unknown node from each
of them, they cooperatively localize the unknown node using their distance information.
Table 2.1 depicts how this can be done using three popular geometric methods, namely,
triangulation, multilateration, and hyperbolic principle [14].
Table 2.1: Summary of the three geometric methods of localization.
Basic Approach Figure
Triangulation: T(x, y)
d
d2d1
N1 N2(g, h) (a, b)R
φ2φ1
− Angles of two sides, Φ1 and Φ2
are calculated to get desired location when the
distance point is unknown
− Importantly the desired point has to be
intersection of two lines from two sides
Multilateration:
d3
N3
d1
T(x, y)
(x3,y3 )
N1 (0, 0)
N2 (x3, 0)
d2
− An extension of Triangulation with three
reference points
− Three point of intersection will give calculated
distance value from reference point to object T.
Hyperbolic principle:
d1
N1 (0, 0)
N2 (g, h)
T(x, y)
d2
D
− It is a set of points that have constant difference
values from two fixed points
Hyperbola’s focus is represented by each point where
focus is an anchor node or reference point
− Position can be calculated when the target resides
between two foci of hyperbola curve
− Curve’s distance to each hyperbola focus are fixed
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2.3.1 Triangulation
Consider the diagram for triangulation in Table 2.1. At the point of intersection, T, the
anchor nodes, N1 and N2, subtend angles, Φ1 and Φ2, respectively. The distance between
N1 and N2 is given by
R =
d
tan Φ1
+
d
tan Φ2
, (2.2)
where d is the perpendicular distance of T from the line joining N1 and N2. The value of
d can be calculated by using the following formula.
d =
R sin Φ1 sin Φ2
sin Φ1 + sin Φ2
, (2.3)
where
Φ1 = tan
−1 h− Y
g −X , (2.4)
Φ2 = tan
−1 b− Y
a−X . (2.5)
If we know the coordinates of the anchor nodes ((a, b) and (g, h)) in the figure, then we can
find the coordinates of the unknown node, (X,Y ).
X =
b− h− a tan Φ2 + g tan Φ1
tan Φ1 − tan Φ2 , (2.6)
Y = x tan Φ2 + (b− a tan Φ1). (2.7)
We can also find the respective distances, d1 and d2, between the anchor nodes, N1 and N2,
and target point, T .
d1 = |g −X| =
√
(g −X)2 − (h− Y )2, (2.8)
d2 = |a−X| =
√
(a−X)2 − (b− Y )2. (2.9)
2.3.2 Multilateration
The example in Table 2.1 shows multilateration with three anchor nodes. The distances
12
from each node is determined using a time difference of arrival protocol such as distance
bounding. The unknown node lies anywhere along the circle with radius d1 from N1, d2 from
N2, and d3 from N3. By solving the equations of these circles we determine the coordinates
of the point of intersection of these three circles. These coordinates are in fact, the location
of the unknown node. The distances from N1, N2, and d3, respectively, are as follows.
d1 = (t1 − t0)c, (2.10)
d2 = (t2 − t0)c, (2.11)
d3 = (t3 − t0)c, (2.12)
where t0 is time at which a signal was sent from T to the three anchor nodes, d1 is distance
between N1 and T , t1 is the time of arrival of signal T to N1, t2 is the time of arrival of
signal T to N2, t3 is the time of arrival of signal T to N3. The equations of the three
intersecting circles are given by
d21 = X
2 + Y 2, (2.13)
d22 = (X − x2)2 + Y 2, (2.14)
d23 = (X − x3)2 + (Y − y3)2. (2.15)
The coordinates of the unknown node obtained by solving these three equations are
X =
x22 + d
2
1 − d22
2x2
, (2.16)
Y =
x23 + y
2
3 − d21 − d23 − 2Xx3
2y3
. (2.17)
2.3.3 Hyperbolic Principle
In this method, the two cooperating anchor nodes, N1 and N2, can calculate a path
difference, ∆d from a given transmitter in Table 2.1. This path difference corresponds to
the equation of a hyperbola. And by solving this equation for X and Y , we can get the
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coordinates of the unknown node.
X2
a2
− Y
2
b2
= 1, (2.18)
where a and b can be obtained from the quantities ∆d and D in Table 2.1.
a2 = (
∆d
2
)2, (2.19)
b2 = (
D
2
)2 − a. (2.20)
The path difference ∆d can be calculated either using the time-delay of recieved signal
(similar to multilateration) or using a path-loss model such as the log-normal shadowing
model [44] as given by equation (2.21).
L(d) = L(d0) + 10η log(
d
d0
) +Xσ. (2.21)
Here, d0 is a predened reference distance close to the transmitter, L(d0) is the average
path loss at the reference distance, and η is a path loss exponent dependent upon the
propagation environment. The signal shadowing is represented by a random variable Xσ
with zero mean and standard deviation σ. Table 2.2 summarizes the localization techniques
we have discussed. For automated vehicles travelling along a dedicated highway, precision
of location is necessary. Therefore, we use a fine-grained approach based on ToA. This
algorithm is known as distance bounding. For determining the position we analyse the
geometric method of trilateration, which is a case of multilateration with three anchor
nodes. In the subsequent sections, we introduce the distance bounding algorithm and the
technique called verifiable trilateration.
2.4 Distance Bounding (DB)
Distance bounding is a method which enables a verifier to establish an upper bound on
the physical distance to a prover. Distance bounding is based on timing the delay between
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Table 2.2: Localization techniques and their features.
Range-based Range-free
Examples: RSSI, ToA/TDoA, AoA Examples: MDS map, DV hop, SLAM
These methods require complex hardware. The hardware depends on the type of
sensors used.
Some methods need time-synchronization No time synchronization is required.
between the transmitter and receiver.
They follow a fine grained approach. They follow a coarse grained approach.
These methods are affected by errors due to These methods are not affected by errors due
multipath fading, shadowing and NLOS. to signal propagation.
They are ideal for non-uniformly distributed They are ideal for uniformly distributed
networks. networks.
The network requires sufficiently large number The network can localize with less number
of anchor nodes. of anchor nodes.
Localization requires coordinates of only a Locaization requires the coordinates or
minimum number of nodes. hop-information of a large number of nodes.
sending out a challenge bits and receiving back the corresponding response bits. The delay
time for responses enables the verifier to compute an upper-bound on the distance, as the
round trip delay time divided into twice the speed of light [8, 45, 46]. The computation is
based on the fact that electromagnetic waves travel nearly at the speed of light in free space
but cannot travel faster. Since, the speed of light remains constant, the only factor that can
influence the distance estimation is the time delay. The verifier stations assume a known
time delay to process the challenge bits and generate the response bits. The actual distance
of a vehicle from a verifier cannot be reduced (as the propagation time cannot be reduced).
But, it can be increased (by deliberately introducing a time delay) so that the estimated
distance of a vehicle is larger than its actual distance. A malicious vehicle can therefore
position itself along the highway in such a way that it can spoof any location whose distance
is larger from the verifier station than itself.
We perform our analysis based on the distance bounding protocol by Brands and
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Chaum [47]. The protocol is based on a prover (P ), trying to authenticate itself to a
verifier (V ), whose task is to establish an upper-bound on the prover’s distance from itself.
The prover starts a series of rapid bit exchanges with a security parameter, k. Before these
bit exchanges take place, a random bit string of length k (m1.....mk) is already sent by
the verifier, V to the prover, P . The following steps are implemented after P receives the
message, m1.....mk.
Step I : V generates uniformly, at random k bits for a rapid bit exchange, Ni where i = 1
to k.
Step II : A series of bits of challenges and responses are exchanged quickly. P responds as
soon as possible bit by bit with a series of n bits f(Ni) to the corresponding bits received
from verifier, Ni. The response of the prover is calculated by P performing an exclusive
OR between the bit Ni and the received bit mi.
Step III : The prover, P , calculates a sign bit string x by concatenating pairs of Ni and
f(Ni) bits to create a series of bits which are then transmitted to V . The calculated x by
V is compared to the x received by V . If the received signature is correct, V computes
the maximum distance at which P is located, using the Round-Trip Time (RTT) of bits
exchanged during Step II, using the speed of an electromagnetic wave.
According to Brands and Chaum, since, today’s electronics can manage computation
times upto a few nanoseconds, and light can travel about 30 cms in a nanosecond, the error
caused due to delay in device processing is much less [47]. Hence, distance bounding can be
an efficient protocol for localization. We will apply distance bounding to our specific case
of localization of a point on an infinite highway.
Protocol 2.1 The basic Brands and Chaum distance bounding protocol.
i = 0, 1, 2, ..., k
V → P : Ni at t = tsi
P → V : f(Ni) at t = tri
V : Calculates f(Nni )
If received bits = calculated bits,
V : Calculates RTT = ts − tr + Tp and DB = c(RTT−Tp)2
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2.5 Verifiable Trilateration
We know the geometric method of multilateration. Verifiable multilateration (VM) is
a mechanism that enables location verification in wireless sensor networks with the help of
simultaneous working verifiers. This mechanism relies on authenticated ranging or distance
bounding within a verification triangle (triangular pyramid) formed by the location veri-
fiers. Due to the property of the distance bounding protocol, attackers can only enlarge
(but not reduce) the measured distance between the infrastructure and the node. There-
fore, if multiple verifiers work simultaneously, we can locate a point in space. Figure 2.1
gives a schematic diagram of how a point in 2-dimensional space can be located by three
verifiers using the distance bounding protocol. When we use three verifiers, the method is
called verifiable trilateration. According to Capkun and Hubaux, the intuition behind the
verifiable multilateration algorithm is the following [8].
“Because of the distance bounding property, the claimant can only pretend to be
more distant from the verifier than it really is. If it increases the measured dis-
tance to one of the verifiers in order to keep the position consistent, the claimant
needs to prove that at least one of the measured distances to other verifiers is
shorter than it actually is, which it cannot because of distance bounding.”
This can be explained with a simple example: if an object is located within the triangle
and it moves to a different position within the triangle, it will certainly reduce its distance
to at least one of the triangle vertices [48]. The same properties hold if an external attacker
enlarges distances between verifiers and an honest claimant. Protocol 2.2 gives the verifiable
multilateration protocol using three verifiers.
2.6 List of Probability Distributions
We use certain probability distribution functions during our analysis of secure local-
ization methods. These probability distributions are briefly reviewed in this section.
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Fig. 2.1: Verifiable multilateration with three verifiers.
Protocol 2.2 The verifiable multilateration protocol.
τ = Φ; set of verifiers that form triangles around υ
ν = v1, ..., vn; set of verifiers in the power range of υ
For all vi ∈ ν, perform distance bounding from vi to υ and obtain dbi.
For all triplets (vi, vj , vk) ∈ µ3,compute the position (x′u, y′u) with dbi, dbj , dbk
by mean square error estimation.
If (x′u, y′u) in ∆(vi, vj , vk) then τ = τ ∪ vi, vj , vk
With all vi ∈ τ , compute the position (x”u, y”u) by mean square error estmation.
If for all vi ∈ τ ,
∣∣∣dbi −√(xi − xu)2 + (yi − yu)2∣∣∣ ≤ δ,
xu = x
′
u, yu = y
′
u
else the position is rejected.
2.6.1 Bernoulli Distribution
It is a discrete probability distribution defined for a Bernoulli trial which yields a
success with probability p and failure with probability q such that p = 1− q. For a random
variable, X following Bernoulli distribution, the probability mass function is given by
f (x) = px (1− p)1−x x ∈ {0, 1} . (2.22)
The mean or expected value is given by
E (x) = p. (2.23)
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And the variance, which is the square of the standard deviation (σ), is given by
σ2 (x) = p (1− p) . (2.24)
2.6.2 Binomial Distribution
It is a discrete probability distribution of the number of successes in a sequence of n
independent Bernoulli trials, each of which yields success with probability p and failure
with probability q where p = 1− q. Bernoulli distribution is a special case of the binomial
distribution when n = 1. For a random variable, X, following the binomial distribution
with parameters n and p, we write X∼ B(n, p). The probability mass function of getting
exactly x successes in n trials is
f (x) = Cnx p
x (1− p)n−x x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n} , (2.25)
where Cnx =
n!
x!(n−x)! . The mean or expected value is given by
E (x) = np. (2.26)
And the variance, which is the square of the standard deviation (σ), is given by
σ2 (x) = np (1− p) . (2.27)
The probability mass function is given by
f (x) = px (1− p)1−x x ∈ {0, 1} . (2.28)
The mean or expected value is given by
E (x) = p. (2.29)
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And the variance, which is the square of the standard deviation (σ), is given by
σ2 (x) = p (1− p) . (2.30)
2.6.3 Poisson Binomial Distribution
It is the discrete probability distribution of a sum of n independent Bernoulli trials
that are not necessarily identically distributed2. For each of the n experiments, success
probability is pi and failure probability is qi, where pi = 1 − qi and i ∈ 0, 1, 2, ..., n. The
ordinary Binomial distribution is a special case of the Poisson Binomial distribution, when
all success probabilities are the same. For a random variable X following the binomial
distribution with parameters n, pi, and pj where i, j ∈ 0, 1, 2, ..., n, the probability mass
function of getting exactly x successes in n trials is
f (x) =
∑
S∈Fx
∏
i∈S
(pi)
∏
j∈Sc
(1− pj) x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n} , (2.31)
where S := set of trials which were a success;
Sc := set of trials which were a failure;
Fx := set of subsets of x integers chosen from 0, 1, 2, ..., n.
The mean or expected value is given by
E (x) =
n∑
i=1
pi. (2.32)
And the variance, which is the square of the standard deviation (σ), is given by
σ2 (x) =
n∑
i=1
pi (1− pi) . (2.33)
2.6.4 Beta Distribution
It is a family of continuous probability distributions defined on the interval [0, 1]
2A sequence or other collection of random variables is independent and identically distributed if each
random variable has the same probability distribution as the others and all are mutually independent.
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parametrized by two positive shape parameters, denoted by α and β, that appear as ex-
ponents of the random variable and control the shape of the distribution. The probability
density function of the beta distribution, for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and shape parameters α > 0 and
β > 0 is
f (x) =
xα−1
(
1− xβ−1)
B (α, β)
, (2.34)
where B (α, β) is a normalizing constant.3 B (α, β) is multiplied to the function such that
its integration from x = 0 to x = 1 is unity. It is given by
B (α, β) =
∫ 1
0
uα−1
(
1− uβ−1
)
du. (2.35)
The mean or expected value is given by
E (x) =
α
α+ β
. (2.36)
And the variance, which is the square of the standard deviation (σ), is given by
σ2 (x) =
αβ
(α+ β)2 (α+ β + 1)
. (2.37)
3A normalizing constant is a constant by which a non-negative function must be multiplied so that the
area under its graph is 1, to make it a probability density function or a probability mass function.
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Chapter 3
Distance Bounding and Trilateration for Localization in an
Automated Transportation System
We discussed localization for vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), which is a sub-
category of intelligent transportation systems (ITS). In this chapter, we apply the methods
of distance bounding and trilateration for an automated transportation system (ATS). We
describe a distance bounding and trilateration infrastructure and describe threat models
for each of the infrastructures. In the end, we schematically illustrate the different attack
scenarios that are possible in these infrastructures.
3.1 Definitions
We refer to an anchor node as a verifier and the vehicle whose location is to be deter-
mined as a prover. In order to make our analysis easier, we define a few terms vis-a-vis an
ATS infrastructure. We will use these terms in the subsequent sections.
Definition 1 Verifier range: The maximum distance over which a verifier is able to send
a signal of acceptable quality.
Definition 2 Verifier scope: The length of the segment of the highway such that a verifier
is responsible for the localization of a vehicle lying on any point belonging to that segment.
Definition 3 Verification unit: The basic unit of the highway infrastructure consisting
of the minimum number of verifiers needed to localize a vehicle on the highway and the
segment of the highway for which this number of verifiers can be considered a standalone
highway infrastructure.
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Definition 4 Verification segment: For a given verification unit, the segment of the high-
way such that the responsibility of localization of a point on it is assigned to that verification
unit.
Definition 5 Spoofing range: The length of the largest segment on the highway such that
an attacker can spoof the position of a given vehicle from any point on that segment by
beguiling a given verifier.
Definition 6 Jamming range: The maximum verifier range under the effect of a benign
jammer intended to restrict communication between a verifier and a vehicle for security
purposes.
Definition 7 Effective vehicle length: The length on the highway required to accommodate
a single vehicle. It is the sum of the length of the vehicle and the mandatory separation
distance that need to be maintained between consecutive vehicles on the highway.
Definition 8 Vehicle position: The point on the highway on which the leading edge of a
vehicle lies. Since, localization is in terms of the position of a point, we will consider the
leading edge of a vehicle to be its position on the highway.
3.2 Threat Model for Distance Bounding and Trilateration
The threat model describes the attacker’s goals and capabilities for a given infrastruc-
ture. In our analysis we consider two colluding attackers in the system who possess the
identity of one or more legitimate vehicles in the system. The attackers are capable of
sharing and using these identities as required. The goal of the attackers is to use the iden-
tity of a legitimate vehicle to falsely localize (spoof) that vehicle on the targeted vehicle
position. The attackers and the target vehicle travel along the same lane on the highway
and hence cannot overtake each other. Also, the attackers do not have control over their
initial position on the highway. For a given vehicle position, the attackers can lie anywhere
on the highway. We now, define the following infrastructures and analyze them according
to our threat model.
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3.3 Infrastructure Implementing Distance Bounding and Trilateration
3.3.1 Distance Bounding with Two Verifiers
Consider an infrastructure consisting of verifiers fixed along an infinite highway. Each
verifier uses the distance bounding algorithm to determine an upper bound to distance of a
prover. Let there be m number of verifiers in a verification unit. Then, the corresponding
distance bounding algorithm is given by Protocol 3.1. We observe that this algorthm is
for a generic infrastructure which uses m verifiers every time a prover position needs to be
determined. We will use this algorithm for m = 2 (implementing only distance bounding)
and m = 3 (implementing trilateration with the distance bounding algorithm). For the
infrastructure with m = 2, we assume an infinite highway with verifiers placed on the
highway as shown in Figure 3.1. There are two verifiers involved in each verification unit.
For instance, the verifiers, V1 and V2, form a verification unit as they work simultaneously
to estimate the position, P, of a prover vehicle travelling between them. V1 determines a
upper-bound on the distance of P from itself. So P cannot lie further along the highway,
than this distance. Similarly, V2 also determines a upper-bound on how far P can be from
itself. From these estimated bounds the position of P between V1 and V2 can be estimated.
P
V1
d
V2 V3
d2d1
Fig. 3.1: Distance bounding infrastructure: verifier range = d, verifier scope = 2d; In case of
a vehicle at position, P: verification unit = V1, V2; verification segment = V1 to V2; spoofing
range of V1 = d1; spoofing range of V2 = d2.
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Protocol 3.1 Verifying a vehicle’s location using distance bounding with m number of
verifiers in a verification unit.
i = 0, 1, 2, ..., k
v = verifier number
m = number of verifiers in a verification unit
At t = tsi
Vn → P : Nni
Vn+1 → P : Nn+1i
Vn+2 → P : Nn+2i
.
.
.
Vn+(m−1) → P : Nn+(m−1)i
At t = tri
P → Vn : f(Nni )
P → Vn+1 : f(Nn+1i )
P → Vn+2 : f(Nn+2i )
.
.
.
P → Vn+(m−1) : f(Nn+(m−1)i )
Vn : Calculates f(N
n
i )
Vn+1 : Calculates f(N
n+1
i )
Vn+2 : Calculates f(N
n+2
i )
.
.
.
Vn+(m−1) : Calculates f(N
n+(m−1)
i )
If received bits = calculated bits,
Vn : Calculates RTTn = tsn− trn+ Tp
DBn =
c(RTTn−Tp)
2
Vn+1 : Calculates RTTn+1 = ts(n+1) − tr(n+1) + Tp
DBn+1 =
c(RTTn+1−Tp)
2
Vn+2 : Calculates RTTn+2 = ts(n+2) − tr(n+2) + Tp
DBn+2 =
c(RTTn+2−Tp)
2
.
.
.
Vn+(m−1) : Calculates RTTn+(m−1) = tsn+(m−1) − trn+(m−1) + Tp
DBn+(m−1) =
c(RTTn+(m−1)−Tp)
2
Here, we assume m = 2. Therefore, by using the above protocol we have the algorithm
given by Protocol 3.2.
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Protocol 3.2 Verifying a vehicle’s location using distance bounding with two verifiers in a
verification unit (basic distance bounding implementation).
i = 0, 1, 2, ..., k
v = verifier number
m = number of verifiers in a verification unit
At t = tsi
Vn → P : Nni
Vn+1 → P : Nn+1i
At t = tri
P → Vn : f(Nni )
P → Vn+1 : f(Nn+1i )
Vn : Calculates f(N
n
i )
Vn+1 : Calculates f(N
n+1
i )
If received bits = calculated bits,
Vn : Calculates RTTn = tsn− trn+ Tp
DBn =
c(RTTn−Tp)
2
Vn+1 : Calculates RTTn+1 = tsn+ 1− trn+ 1 + Tp
DBn+1 =
c(RTTn+1−Tp)
2
3.3.2 Vulnerability Analysis of Distance Bounding with Two Verifiers
It requires a minimum of two attackers to defeat this method. If two malicious vehicles
on the same or adjacent verification segment have the location information of a target
vehicle, they can impersonate this vehicle and generate false position information. As the
attackers move from one verification unit to another, we have three different scenarios of
spoofing. Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 depict the three best case scenarios for two attackers,
A1 and A2, to spoof the position of any vehicle lying on the highway-segment of length d
by simultaneously beguiling the verifiers involved in that verification unit.
In the first attack scenario, shown in Figure 3.2, A2 is in the verification unit V1,V2
and is approaching V2, V3 while A1 is already in V2, V3. The attackers can spoof any point
on the segment of length, d by beguiling V2 and V3. A2 is closer to verifier, V2 while A1 is
closer to V3. Therefore, in order to spoof a position between V2 and V3, A2, and A1 must
simultaneously beguile V2 and V3, respectively. A2 can spoof any position on the segments
labeled as A2V2 by beguiling V2. Similarly, A1 can spoof any position on the segments
labeled as A1V3 by beguiling V3. Any point on the segment of length d can be effectively
spoofed by A1 and A2. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the other two scenarios.
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Fig. 3.2: Distance bounding, attack scenario I: The attackers (A1 and A2) are in adjacent
verification units.
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Fig. 3.3: Distance bounding, attack scenario II: Both the attackers lie in the same verifica-
tion unit (V2,V3).
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Fig. 3.4: Distance bounding, attack scenario III: A1 has crossed the former verification unit
and entered a new one (V3, V4). However, A1 is still closer to V3 as compared to A2.
3.3.3 Distance Bounding with Three Verifiers (Trilateration)
The assumed architecture consists of individual vehicles or vehicle platoons moving
on an infinite highway which runs through a series of triangles formed by verifiers placed
along the highway. There are three verifiers acting simultaneously to locate a vehicle on
the highway. One verifier forms the vertex of three different triangles. Each verifier is
responsible for verification of vehicles within the triangles whose vertex it forms. This
infrastructure is shown in Figure 3.5.
We notice that changing the perpendicular distance of a verifier from the highway does
not affect the verifier scope or the spoofing range. Figure 3.6 illustrates this with three
different infrastructures. The lines connecting the verifiers intersect on the highway at the
same points (P1 to P6). Also, the circles determining the position P for each architecture
type intersect at the same points on the highway. These points of intersection demarcate
the segments which can be spoofed from behind and the front of a vehicle at position P.
Three verifiers, V1, V2, and V3, use the distance bounding protocol simultaneously to
find an upper-bound of the distance of a prover P from each of them and estimate a position
on the highway according to Protocol 3.3.
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V2 V6
V7V5V3
V4
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6P
V1
d1 d2
d
r
d3
Fig. 3.5: Trilateration infrastructure: verifier range = r, verifier scope = 3d. In case of
a vehicle at position, P: verification unit = V3, V4, V5; verification segment = P3 to P4;
spoofing range of V3 = d1; spoofing range of V4 = d2; spoofing range of V5 = d3.
Vc7Vc5Vc3
Vc6Vc2
Vb7Vb5Vb3Vb1
Vb2 Vb4
Vc4
Vc1
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
Va1 Va3
Va2
Va7
Va6Va4
Va5
Vb6
P
Fig. 3.6: Trilateration infrastructures (a, b, and c) consisting of five verification units and
with the respective verifiers marked as Van, Vbn, and Vcn; n = 1 to 7.
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Protocol 3.3 Verifying a vehicle’s location using distance bounding with three verifiers in
a verification unit (trilateration).
i = 0, 1, 2, ..., k
v = verifier number
m = number of verifiers in a verification unit
At t = tsi
Vn → P : Nni
Vn+1 → P : Nn+1i
Vn+2 → P : Nn+1i
At t = tri
P → Vn : f(Nni )
P → Vn+1 : f(Nn+1i )
P → Vn+2 : f(Nn+2i )
Vn : Calculates f(N
n
i )
Vn+1 : Calculates f(N
n+1
i )
Vn+2 : Calculates f(N
n+2
i )
If received bits = calculated bits,
Vn : Calculates RTTn = tsn− trn+ Tp
DBn =
c(RTTn−Tp)
2
Vn+1 : Calculates RTTn+1 = tsn+ 1− trn+ 1 + Tp
DBn+1 =
c(RTTn+1−Tp)
2
Vn+2 : Calculates RTTn+2 = tsn+ 2− trn+ 2 + Tp
DBn+2 =
c(RTTn+2−Tp)
2
3.3.4 Vulnerability Analysis of Trilateration
An attacker knows that it can spoof a distance larger than its actual distance. There-
fore, it will look for positions on the highway where it can beguile a verifier into thinking
that it is farther away than it actually is. There are two main scenarios each of which can
be further sub-divided to four scenarios depending on the positions an attacker can occupy.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 depict the scenarios when attackers are at different parts of a verification
unit.
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Fig. 3.7: Trilateration, attack scenario I: The attackers (A1 and A2) are in adjacent verifi-
cation units (V0,V1,V2) and (V1,V2,V3).
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Fig. 3.8: Trilateration, attack scenario II: Both the attackers lie in the same verification
unit (V1,V2,V3).
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Chapter 4
Friendly Jamming as a Localization Technique
4.1 Introduction to Friendly Jamming
Friendly jamming is a concept of enchancing the security of the physical layer in wireless
communications. An eavesdropper can access information from a source sending information
to a receiver using the wireless channel. The aim of friendly jamming is to create strategies
such that this information is limited only to the receiver while any eavesdropper only receives
interference and hence is not able to get the actual useful data. It is assumed that the
channels are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels [49].
There are basically two solutions to increase the secrecy of an information sent by a
node to a legitimate receiver.
I : By improving the SNR of the legitimate receiver (e.g. by shortening the distance to the
source).
II : By reducing the SNR of the eavesdropper (e.g. by adding controlled interference).
Friendly jamming is based on the second approach. There are three jamming strategies,
proposed by Vilela et al. [50]. These are:
Blunt jamming : The jammer emits white Gaussian noise with variance at all times. We call
this jammer a blunt jammer because it disregards any possible channel state information
(CSI) and transmits at a constant power.
Cautious jamming : A cautious jammer takes advantage of the knowledge of the channel
state information (CSI) between itself and both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdrop-
per and opportunistically decides when to jam. It jams whenever it has a higher gain to
the eavesdropper than to the legitimate receiver, and switches off otherwise.
Adaptive jamming : An adaptive jammer has CSI about the channel to the legitimate re-
ceiver only. This strategy corresponds to a situation in which the eavesdropper intercepts
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the communications without providing any sign of its presence. In this case, the jammer
denes a threshold for the channel quality, above which it will stop jamming since it is likely
that his induced noise will hurt the legitimate receiver more than a potential eavesdropper.
Friendly jamming can be implemented for localization in a highway infrastructure by
having the transmitter (verifier), legitimate receiver (vehicle under verification), and any
eavesdropper (potential attacker) to transmit signals through an additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel, such that the position information sent by a vehicle to the verifier
cannot be intercepted by nearby vehicles [51]. Jamming can be achieved by either increasing
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the verifier/legitimate vehicle or by reducing the SNR for
nearby vehicles, by introducing controlled interference. Out of the various strategies, blunt
jamming is suitable in case of secure localization as in the proposed protocol, we need
a high jamming efficiency and lowest possible coverage area [50]. This ensures a secure
exchange of information that takes place between a vehicle and a verifier for authenticating
the information provided by the vehicle [51].
4.2 Infrastructure Implementing Friendly Jamming
In our proposed secure localization approach, a vehicle proves its position claim by
responding to messages from verifiers that can only be received within the locale of the
verifiers. To ensure that communication between provers and verifiers can only take place
within a certain radius of the verifiers we utilize friendly jamming at the verifiers. To ac-
complish this, each verifier would employ one set of antennas to transmit the verification
message, with a second set placed outside the first and transmitting noise in an outward
direction so as to obscure the verification message as shown in Figure 4.1. The granularity
of position measurements would depend on the number and spacing of these verifiers. In
addition, establishing the veracity of a vehicle’s position claim using friendly jamming re-
quires separate channels for communication between the vehicle and a coordinating agent
(part of the local verification infrastructure) and the vehicle and two verifiers.
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message
noise
noise
Fig. 4.1: A friendly jamming verifier design using jammers (red) that ensures a verification
message (blue) can only be received at the given locality (green circle). A vehicle must lie
within this locality to receive a message.
4.3 The Friendly Jamming Protocol
The Protocol 4.1 implements friendly jamming for verification of a location along an
infinite highway. First, the vehicle under consideration is queried for its current location,
x0, and velocity, v0. Having received this information, the infrastructure calculates the
time t1, based on the reported position/velocity and current time, t0, at which the vehicle
should reach the nearest upcoming verifier, V1 (located at x1). A random nonce, N1, is
then generated and sent to V1 along with the time, t1, at which it should be transmitted.
This process is repeated for a second verifier, V2 (located at x2), using a new nonce, N2,
and transmit time, t2. At time t1 and t2 the vehicle passes within the range of V1 and
V2, respectively, and collects N1 and N2. To prove its original position claim the vehicle
transmits the nonces back to the infrastructure. It is assumed that all communication be-
tween the infrastructure and verifiers is encrypted, and that the prover shares secret keys
with the infrastructure, KIP , verifier one, KV1P , and verifier two, KV2P , for the purposes
of authenticating messages.
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Protocol 4.1 Verifying a vehicle’s location using friendly jamming.
P → I : x0, v0,MACKIP (x0, v0)
I : Calculate time t1 =
x1−x0
v0
+ t0 at which P reaches V1 and
: t2 =
x2−x0
v0
+ t0 at which P reaches V2
I : Generate random nonces N1, N2
I → V1 : N1, t1
I → V2 : N2, t2
V1 : Wait until t1
V1 → P : NV1 ,MACKV1P (NV1)
V2 : Wait until t2
V2 → P : NV2 ,MACKV2P (NV2)
P → I : NV1 , NV2 ,MACKIP (NV1 , NV2)
I : Verify x0, v0 for P if received nonces match transmitted
4.4 Threat Models for Friendly Jamming
We analyse the friendly jamming infrastructure for two scenarios. Hence, we have two
different threat models corresponding to each scenario.
Scenario I : There is one attacker in the system in possession of the identity of one or more
legitimate vehicles in the system. In addition, the attacker also has the PV (position and
velocity) information of a legitimate vehicle. The goal of the attacker is to use the identity
and PV information to pass itself off to a verifier as another legitimate vehicle and hence,
falsely localize that legitimate vehicle (spoof) on the highway. The attacker and target
vehicle are assumed to travel along the same lane on the highway. For a given vehicle
position, the attacker can lie anywhere on the verification segment of the highway to which
that position belongs. The attacker is capable of accelerating (or decelerating) upto a given
limit. However, it does not have control over its initial position on the highway.
Scenario II : There are two colluding attackers in the system and each attacker targets one
verifier in the verification unit. The attackers are in possession of the identity and PV
information of one or more legitimate vehicles and they are capable of sharing and using
this information. The goal of the attackers is to use the identity and PV information to pass
themselves off to each of the two verifiers as one legitimate vehicle and hence, falsely localize
that legitimate vehicle (spoof) on the highway. Both of the attackers and target vehicle
are assumed to travel along the same lane on the highway. The attackers cannot overtake
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any vehicle on the highway. This results in the restriction that the attacker targeting the
second verifier must always be ahead of the attacker targeting the first verifier. For a given
vehicle position, the attackers can lie anywhere on the verification segment of the highway
to which that position belongs. The attackers are capable of accelerating (or decelerating)
independently upto a given limit and do not have control over their initial positions on the
highway.
4.5 Vulnerability Analysis of Friendly Jamming
For a preliminary analysis of the security of this approach, let us assume that an
attacker located at xa and traveling with a uniform velocity, va attempts to spoof the
position P by reporting, at time t = 0, its location and velocity as x0 and v0, respectively
(Figure 4.2). Allowing the verifiers,V1 and V2 to be located at x1 and x2, respectively, at
times t1 = (x1 − x0)/v0 and t2 = (x2 − x0)/v0, the verifiers will transmit their respective
nonces. The attacker’s actual position and velocity must be such that at times t1 and t2
they are at x1 and x2; xa , va must satisfy x1 = xa+vat1 and x2 = xa+vat2. By rearranging
these expressions and taking the ratios of t1 and t2, we have
t1
t2
=
x1 − x0
x2 − x0 =
x1 − xa
x2 − xa , (4.1)
which shows that the attacker must be at the position P (xa = x0) in order to acquire both
nonces. Thus, it is not possible for an the attacker traveling at a constant velocity to prove
any position but their actual position. In section 5.4, we analyze the case of an attacker
with the capability to accelerate or decelerate in order to reach a verifier at the correct
time and then we analyze the case when there are two colluding attackers, each capable of
accelerating or decelerating independently.
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Fig. 4.2: Friendly jamming infrastructure: verifier range = d; verifier scope = d, at time
t = 0 and t = t3 and δ at time t = t1 and t = t2. In case of a vehicle at position, P:
verification unit = V1, V2; verification segment = 0 to V2.
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Chapter 5
Spoofing Probability
We have analysed the vulnerability of the architectures using distance bounding, tri-
lateration, and friendly jamming in the previous chapter. Now, we will assign a measure to
the vulnerability of each of these infrastructures. For this purpose we define a term known
as spoofing probability as follows.
Definition 9 Spoofing probability: The likelihood of a verifier calculating the vehicle po-
sition of a legitimate vehicle erroneously, due to false information provided by malicious
vehicles randomly situated on the highway.
Consider a basic implementation of distance bounding as shown in Figure 3.1. To find the
probability of spoofing of a given point on the highway from a given verifier, we can draw
analogy from the simple experiment of tossing a coin. For one instance of tossing a coin we
have two possible outcomes. Similarly, for a given instance of verifying a position by one
verifier there can be a set of two mutually exclusive outcomes, denoted by X = {S, Sc},
where S indicates that the position of the vehicle can be spoofed while Sc indicates that
the position of the vehicle cannot be spoofed.
If the distance of a vehicle from two verifiers, Vm and Vn, are xm and xn, respectively,
we will have two different sets of outcomes for each verifier. On the assumption that the
likelihood of spoofing a point from two different verifiers are independent of each other, the
probability of spoofing the vehicle position on a infrastructure using two verifiers is
P (x = xm|x = xn)P (x = xn|x = xm) = P (x = xm)P (x = xn) , (5.1)
where x is the random variable denoting the distance between a verifier and a point. We
use this property to find the probability density function of spoofing for more complex
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infrastructures involving multiple verifiers.
The tossing of a coin for a set of trials follows a binomial distribution. However, we
cannot use binomial distribution to model the spoofing of a point because in the case of
tossing a coin, the probability of a success is always a constant (0.5). However, in case of
the spoofing of a point from a set of verifiers, the probability of a success for each verifier
depends on the distance of the point from the corresponding verifier. Thus, we can use a
Poisson binomial distribution to find the probability of spoofing a point from x verifiers
out of a set of n verifiers. This is the case of spoofing a single point in space from a given
number of verifiers.
5.1 Sample Space and Probability Density Function
We use σ-algebra to define our sample space and then we assign a probability measure
to each element of this sample space. Following the three criteria for a set to be defined
as a σ-algebra [52], we consider a set of points, (Σ) lying within the verification scope of a
given verifier to be a σ-algebra defined over the set, (Ω) which is the set of all points on the
highway. In set-notation,
Ω = x (P ) ∈ [0,∞) and Σ ⊂ Ω defined by
Σ = {y (P ) ∈ [0, d] : y (P ) = |x (P )− x (V )|}
where
x (P ) = position of the point, P from x = 0,
x (P ) = position of the verifier, V from x = 0, and
d = distance between adjacent verifiers.
The cardinality of the set, Σ, i.e. ‖Σ‖ = d, is essentially the verifier scope for the given
infrastructure. Suppose the position of the attacker A is at x(A). It can then spoof the
point at x(P ) from the verifier at x(V ) if
|x (P )− x (V )| ≤ |x (A)− x (V )| , (5.2)
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where the value of |x (P )− x (V )| is the spoofing range of P from the verifier V .
Let us consider a platoon of vehicles traveling along the highway-infrastructure assumed
for distance bounding. The effective vehicle length of all vehicles are assumed to be the
same and equal to L. The spoofing probability is the number of vehicles within the spoofing
range divided by the number of vehicles in the sample space, i.e. the verifier scope. Since
the leading edge of a vehicle to marks the vehicle position, the number of possible attackers
within the scope of a verifier behind the vehicle is
⌈
2x
L
⌉ − 1. For a verifier in front, the
number of possible attackers is
⌊
2(d−x)
L
⌋
.
An attacker can spoof a vehicle’s location either from behind or from the front depend-
ing on which verifier it is closer to compared to the target vehicle. When a vehicle has
crossed a verifier and is still within the verifier scope, an attacker can spoof from behind
and the corresponding probability density function is given by
Pb (x = P ) =
⌈
2x
L
⌉− 1⌈
d+x
L
⌉
+
⌊
d−x
L
⌋− 1 . (5.3)
Similarly, when a vehicle is approaching a verifier and is currently within the verifier scope,
it can be spoofed by an attacker at the front and the corresponding probability density
function is given by
Pf (x = P ) =
⌊
2(d−x)
L
⌋
⌈
x
L
⌉
+
⌊
2d−x
L
⌋− 1 . (5.4)
We can verify that these are valid pdfs which follows the axioms of probability [53]. If we
consider the effective vehicle length to be infinitesimally small compared to the distances
along the highway, the pdf can be calculated by applying a limit to L. For a vehicle spoofing
a position to its rear
lim
L→ 0 Pb (x = P ) =
⌈
2x
L
⌉− 1⌈
d+x
L
⌉
+
⌊
d−x
L
⌋− 1 = L×
(⌈
2x
L
⌉− 1)
L× (⌈d+xL ⌉+ ⌊d−xL ⌋− 1)
=
2x− L
(d+ x) + (d− x)− L
1 =
x
d
.
(5.5)
40
Similarly, for a vehicle spoofing a forward position
lim
L→ 0 Pf (x = P ) = d− x
d
. (5.6)
5.2 Spoofing Probability of the Distance Bounding Infrastructure
There needs to be a minimum of two attackers working simultaneously to spoof the ve-
hicle position from the respective verifiers responsible for localization. As the vehicle moves
from the beginning of the verification segment to the end of it, the spoofing probability,
PDB is the probability of a position getting spoofed from behind, when it has been spoofed
from the front and vice versa. Equation (5.1) can be applied to this case. Therefore,
PDB =
x
d
× d− x
d
=
x (d− x)
d2
. (5.7)
We find that the spoofing probability is similar to the beta distribution when the parameters
α = 2, β = 2. The steps used to proof this are as follows. From equation (5.7),
PDB =
x
d
× d− x
d
=
x
d
×
(
1− x
d
)
. (5.8)
Let xd = v, where 0 ≤ v ≤ 1,
PDB = v × (1− v) . (5.9)
The probability distribution function for a beta distribution is given by
f (v) =
1
B (α, β)
vα−1 × (1− v)β−1 . (5.10)
Let α = 2, β = 2. Also, the normalizing constant, 1B(α,β) is given by
B (2, 2) =
∫ 1
0
v (1− v) dv. (5.11)
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Since, v = xd ⇒ dv = 1ddx. And v → 1⇒ x→ d
B (2, 2) =
∫ d
0
x
d
×
(
1− x
d
) 1
d
dx
=
1
d
∫ d
0
x
d
− x
2
d2
dx
=
1
d3
[
3x2d− 2x3
6
]0
d
=
1
6
⇒ f (v) = 6× v × (1− v) .
(5.12)
Comparing equations (5.9) and (5.10),
PDB = 6× f (v) . (5.13)
Thus, we can express spoofing probability as a probability distribution function following
the beta distribution with α = 2, β = 2, B (α, β) = 16 and v =
x
d such that 0 ≤ v ≤ 1. The
mean or expected value is given by
mean =
α
α+ β
. (5.14)
In our case it is calculated to be v = 12 or x =
d
2 . The variance and standard deviation (SD)
from the mean is given by
variance =
αB
(α+ β)2 (α+ β + 1)
,
SD =
√
variance.
(5.15)
In our case it is calculated to be d
√
variance
10 . Now, we can apply and find out the mean
and standard deviation for other infrastructures which use the distance bounding protocol.
We use the same steps for the trilateration infrastructure. Figure 5.1 shows the spoofing
probability for three distance bounding infrastructures with different values of d (distance
between adjacent verifiers).
42
Fig. 5.1: Spoofing probability for three distance bounding infrastructures, schematically
drawn below the graph with verifiers in blue, green, and red, as a function of the position
of the targeted vehicle as it travels along a verification unit.
5.3 Spoofing Probability of the Verifiable Trilateration Infrastructure
As a vehicle moves along the verification segment in this infrastructure from one end
towards the center, the probability of spoofing a position from the front goes on decreasing
and becomes zero when the vehicle is right in front of the verifier at the center. If we assume
two colluding attackers, one in front and the other at the back, the roles of the attackers
switch after the vehicle crosses the center. The spoofing probability for the given trilater-
ation infrastructure is given according to the location of the vehicle within a verification
segment.
Pb =
⌈
2x
L
⌉− 1⌈
3/2d+x
L
⌉
+
⌊
3/2d−x
L
⌋
− 1
for 0 ≤ x ≤ d. (5.16)
Pb =
⌈
2(x−d)
L
⌉
− 1⌈
d/2+x
L
⌉
+
⌊
5/2d−x
L
⌋
− 1
for d ≤ x ≤ 2d. (5.17)
Pf =
⌊
2(d−x)
L
⌋
− 1⌈
d/2+x
L
⌉
+
⌊
5/2d−x
L
⌋
− 1
for 0 ≤ x ≤ d. (5.18)
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Pf =
⌊
2(2d−x)
L
⌋
− 1⌈
d/2+x
L
⌉
+
⌊
5/2d−x
L
⌋
− 1
for d ≤ x ≤ 2d. (5.19)
As in the case of distance bounding, the probability of spoofing from the front and the
back are independent of each other (as they involve two different verifiers). The spoofing
probability of a vehicle position is given by the product of probability of spoofing from the
front and the back.
PTrilateration = Pb × Pf . (5.20)
Figure 5.2 shows the spoofing probability for three distance bounding infrastructures with
different values of d (distance between adjacent verifiers).
5.4 Spoofing Probability of the Friendly Jamming Infrastructure
In this method, we consider the sample space as given by equation (5.2). However,
the condition for spoofing is different from that of distance bounding and trilateration. An
attacker can spoof only those positions which are not already occupied by another vehicle.
This is because if a position is occupied by a legitimate vehicle, then this vehicle crosses the
verifiers at the times calculated by the verifiers from its position/velocity (PV) information.
However, an attacker can spoof a segment along the highway before it reaches the first
verifier. In addition to position, the attacker must be able to spoof its velocity so that the
times calculated by the false PV information transmitted by the attacker matches with its
actual times of crossing. Therefore, the spoofing probability will depend on the attacker’s
position relative to the target position and also the attacker velocity relative to the target
velocity. We will find the spoofing probability as a ratio of the available lengths within the
range of velocity differences available for spoofing and the sum of all such lengths as the
position changes along the verification unit. According to the threat model described for
the friendly jamming infrastructure, we will analyze spoofing in two cases.
Case I : A single attacker verifying for both verifiers.
Case II : Two colluding attackers acting independently to verify for one verifier each. In
order to find the available lengths and the range of velocity differences, we should be able
44
Fig. 5.2: Spoofing probability for three trilateration infrastructures, schematically drawn
below the graph with verifiers in blue, green, and red, as a function of the position of the
targeted vehicle as it travels along a verification unit.
to establish an upper and lower bound on the difference between the actual and target PV
information and then find a condition such that for an instant of verifying a point from a
given verifier, the outcome S (that the position cannot be spoofed) is true.
Case I : Single attacker
Let {x0, v0} be the PV information that an attacker wants to spoof. The infrastructure
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determines the times of crossing t1 and t2 as
t1 =
x1 − x0
v0
,
t2 =
x2 − x0
v0
.
(5.21)
However, the attacker has an actual PV as it travels along the highway. Let its actual PV
be denoted by {xa, va}. The attacker must accelerate or decelerate in order to be able to
reach the verifiers on time. Allow a1 and a2 to be the accelerations required to reach verifier
V1 in time t1 and V2 in time t2. Equations (5.22) and (5.25) give the motion of the attacker
from the beginning of the verification segment (considered to be the origin) to V1 and then
from V1 to V2.
x1 − xa = va0t1 + 1
2
a1t
2
1
= va0
(
x1 − x0
v0
)
+
1
2
a1
(
x1 − x0
v0
)2
.
(5.22)
As x1 = d, where d = distance between adjacent verifiers,
d− xa = va
(
d− x0
v0
)
+
1
2
a1
(
d− x0
v0
)2
⇒a1 =
2
[
(d− xa)− va
(
d−x0
v0
)]
(
d−x0
v0
)2 . (5.23)
Let xa − x0 = ∆x and va − v0 = ∆v
⇒ a1 = −2
[
∆x
(
v0
d− x0
)2
+ ∆v
(
v0
d− x0
)]
. (5.24)
Using the fact that the vehicle motion from verifier one to two is
x2 − x1 = va1 (t2 − t1) + 1
2
a2 (t2 − t1)2 , (5.25)
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and va1 = va + a1t1, we have
⇒x2 − x1 = (va + a1t1) (t2 − t1) + 1
2
a2 (t2 − t1)2
=
[
va +
(
a1 − 1
2
a2
)
t1 +
1
2
a2t2
]
(t2 − t1)
⇒ (v0 − va) =
(
a1 − 1
2
a2
)(
x1 − x0
v0
)
+
1
2
a2
(
x2 − x0
v0
)
.
(5.26)
As x2 = 2x1 = 2d, the equation reduces to
a2 =
−2 [a1 (d− x0) + v0∆v]
d
. (5.27)
Finally, substituting the value of a1
a2 = 2
[
2∆x
v20
d (d− x0) + ∆v
v0
d
]
. (5.28)
As vehicles are limited in their ability to accelerate and decelerate, allow the magnitude of
maximum acceleration to be denoted by γ. The magnitudes of a1 and a1 are bounded by
γ. Thus,
|a1| ≤ γ
⇒
∣∣∣∣∣∆x
(
v0
d− x0
)2
+ ∆v
(
v0
d− x0
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ2
⇒|∆xv0 + ∆v (d− x0)| ≤ γ
2
(d− x0)2
v0
⇒± [∆xv0 + ∆v (d− x0)] ≤ γ
2
(d− x0)2
v0
⇒± [∆xv0]± [∆v (d− x0)] ≤ γ
2
(d− x0)2
v0
.
(5.29)
Since, v0 and d−x0 are always positive quantities during the course of the vehicle traveling
from x = 0 to x = x0, we have
|∆x| v0 + |∆v| (d− x0) ≤ γ
2
(d− x0)2
v0
. (5.30)
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Similarly, the bounds on the attacker’s acceleration to reach the second verifier is
|a2| ≤ γ
⇒2 |∆x| v0 + |∆v| (d− x0) ≤ γ
2
d (d− x0)
v0
.
(5.31)
Considering (5.30) and (5.31), with the limit ∆v → 0, we find the maximum value of ∆x
and then considering these equations with limit ∆x→ 0 we find the maximum value of ∆v.
The range of values for ∆x and ∆v are given by (5.32) and (5.33).
0 < |∆x| < γ
2
(d− x0)2
v20
for verifier, V1.
0 < |∆x| < γ
4
d (d− x0)
v20
for verifier, V2.
(5.32)
0 < |∆v| < γ
2
d− x0
v0
for verifier, V1.
0 < |∆v| < γ
2
d
v0
for verifier, V2.
(5.33)
In case of friendly jamming, the spoofing probability depends not only in the position, x0
but also in the target velocity v0. Let us define the spoofing probability for a constant
difference in velocities i.e. ∆v = 0, ...vn...,∆vmax, where vn is an arbitrary value of ∆v and
∆vmax is the maximum value of ∆v given by equation (5.33). The formula of spoofing
probability for verifier, V1 when v0 and ∆v are constants and x0 varies, is given by
PV1,v0,∆v (x = x0,∆v = ∆vn) =
γ
2
(d−x0)2
v20
−∆vn (d−x0)v0∑d
x0=0
γ
2
(d−x0)2
v20
−∆vn (d−x0)v0
. (5.34)
Similarly, we can find the spoofing probability for verifier, V2, considering the above steps
and using the corresponding expressions for ∆v and ∆x from equation (5.32) and (5.33).
The formula is given by
PV2,v0,∆v (x = x0,∆v = ∆vn) =
γ
4
d(d−x0)
v20
−∆vn (d−x0)2v0∑d
x0=0
d(d−x0)
v20
−∆vn (d−x0)2v0
. (5.35)
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The equation (5.34) can be expanded into the following steps for ease of computation.
P∆v=0 (x = x0, v = v0) = P
(
|∆x| < γ
2
(d− x0)2
v20
)
= P (|∆x| < ∆xmax)
.
.
.
P∆v=vn (x = x0, v = v0) = P
(
|∆x| < γ
2
(d− x0)2
v20
−∆vn (d− x0)
v0
)
.
.
.
P∆v=vmax (x = x0, v = v0) = P
(
|∆x| < γ
2
(d− x0)2
v20
−∆vmax (d− x0)
v0
)
= P
(
|∆x| < ∆xmax −∆vmax (d− x0)
v0
)
= P (|∆x| < 0) .
The spoofing probability for verifier, V1, when ∆v varies along with x is given by
P (x = x0, v = v0) = P
(
|∆x| < γ
2
(d− x0)2
v20
−∆v (d− x0)
v0
)
. (5.36)
If v0 is kept constant, the bounds for ∆x in the RHS depends on two variables, i.e.x0 and
∆v. Now, the formula for spoofing probability is given by
PV1,v0 =
γ
2
(d−x0)2
v20
−∆vn (d−x0)v0∑∆vmax
∆v=0
∑d
x0=0
γ
2
(d−x0)2
v20
−∆vn (d−x0)v0
. (5.37)
The spoofing probability for both V1 and V2 is given by
PV1,v0,∆v
⋂
PV2,v0,∆v = P (V2|V1)P (V1). (5.38)
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From equation (5.25) and (5.26), we know that the bounds for V2 is calculated assuming
that the attacker has already crossed V1. Hence, P (V2|V1) = PV2,v0,∆v, P (V1) = PV1,v0,∆v
and
PV1,v0,∆v
⋂
PV 2,v0,∆v = PV1,v0,∆v.PV2,v0,∆v. (5.39)
Case II : Two colluding attackers
Let {x0, v0} be the PV information that two colluding attackers, A1 and A2, want to spoof.
Let us assume that A1 targets the first verifier, V1, and A2 targets the second verifier, V2.
The motion of these attackers are independent, i.e. their acceleration can be different and
depends only on their position and velocity with respect to the target PV information. Let
aA1 be the acceleration of A from x = 0 to x = d (position of V1) and aA2 be the acceleration
of A2 from x = 0 to x = 2d (position of V2). The equation of motion for A1 would be same
as that of a single attacker trying to reach V1 at time t1. It is given by equation (5.22).
Therefore, for the attacker, A1, we have
x1 − xA1 = vA10t1 +
1
2
aA1t
2
1
= vA10
(
x1 − x0
v0
)
+
1
2
aA1
(
x1 − x0
v0
)2
,
(5.40)
which finally results in
⇒ aA = −2
[
∆x
(
v0
d− x0
)2
+ ∆v
(
v0
d− x0
)]
. (5.41)
Now, the attacker, A2, has to cover a distance x2 − xA2 = 2d in time t2, which gives the
following equations.
x1 − xA2 = vA20t2 +
1
2
aA2t
2
2
= vA20
(
x2 − x0
v0
)
+
1
2
aA2
(
x2 − x0
v0
)2
,
(5.42)
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which finally results in
⇒ aA2 = −2
[
∆x
(
v0
2d− x0
)2
+ ∆v
(
v0
2d− x0
)]
. (5.43)
This finally results in the following bounds in position (∆xA1 and ∆xA2) and bounds in
velocity ( ∆vA1 and ∆vA2 ) for attackers A1 and A2. It is similar to equation (5.30). We
have
|∆xA1 | v0 + |∆vA1 | (d− x0) ≤
γ
2
(d− x0)2
v0
. (5.44)
And for attacker A2 (by replacing d with 2d) we have
|∆xA2 | v0 + |∆vA2 | (2d− x0) ≤
γ
2
(2d− x0)2
v0
. (5.45)
The maximum values are given by
0 < |∆xA1 | <
γ
2
(d− x0)2
v20
for verifier, V1
0 < |∆xA2 | <
γ
2
(2d− x0)2
v20
for verifier, V2,
(5.46)
0 < |∆vA1 | <
γ
2
d− x0
v0
for verifier, V1
0 < |∆vA2 | <
γ
2
2d− x0
v0
for verifier, V2.
(5.47)
The formula of spoofing probability for verifier, V1 by A1, when v0 and ∆v are constants
and x0 varies, is given by
PA1,v0,∆v (x = x0,∆v = ∆vn) =
γ
2
(d−x0)2
v20
−∆vn (d−x0)v0∑d
x0=0
γ
2
(d−x0)2
v20
−∆vn (d−x0)v0
. (5.48)
The formula of spoofing probability for verifier, V2 by A2, when v0 and ∆v are constants
and x0 varies, is given by
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PA2,v0,∆v (x = x0,∆v = ∆vn) =
γ
2
(2d−x0)2
v20
−∆vn (2d−x0)v0∑2d
x0=0
γ
2
(2d−x0)2
v20
−∆vn (2d−x0)v0
. (5.49)
Since, A1 needs to reach V1 before A2 needs to reach V2, there is this restriction that A2 is
always ahead of A1. This implies that A2(x) > A1(x) where A1(x), A2(x) are the positions
of A1, A2 along the highway. The probability that the position is spoofed from both V1 and
V2 is
PA1,v0,∆v
⋂
PA2,v0,∆v
= PA1,v0,∆v|x=0(PA2,v0,∆v|x=1 + PA2,v0,∆v|x=2 + . . . +
PA2,v0,∆v|x=xn + . . . + PA2,v0,∆v|x=2d)+
PA1,v0,∆v|x=1(PA2,v0,∆v|x=2 + PA2,v0,∆v|x=3 + . . . +
PA2,v0,∆v|x=xn + . . . + PA2,v0,∆v|x=2d)+
PA1,v0,∆v|x=2(PA2,v0,∆v|x=3 + PA2,v0,∆v|x=4 + . . . +
PA2,v0,∆v|x=xn + . . . + PA2,v0,∆v|x=2d)+
.
.
.
+PA1,v0,∆v|x=d(PA2,v0,∆v|x=d+1 + PA2,v0,∆v|x=d+2 + . . . +
PA2,v0,∆v|x=d+xn + . . . + PA2,v0,∆v|x=2d)
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 represent spoofing probability of a single attacker targeting the
verifiers, V1 and V2, respectively, and Figure 5.5 represents the spoofing probability of a
single attacker targeting both the verifiers, V1 and V2. The positions are marked from the
origin, x = 0. The separation distance (d) between verifiers is 100 metres with the first
verifier at x = 100. We observe that the spoofing probability of distance bounding and
triangulation exhibits the properties similar to the beta distribution when α = 2 and β = 2,
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while friendly jamming is similar to the beta distribution when α = 1 and β = 3. Figure
5.6 represents the spoofing probability of a second attacker, A2, targeting the verifier, V2.
This attacker may collude with A1, targeting V1 to spoof a position from the verification
system. Figure 5.7 represents spoofing probability of two colluding attackers, A1 and A2,
targeting the verifiers, V1 and V2, respectively. The spoofing probability for a constant
∆v is independent of the maximum allowable acceleration. It is only dependant on the
range of distances ∆x = 0 to ∆xmax. This allows us to compare the spoofing probability
of friendly jamming with distance bounding and trilateration. If we consider the range of
velocities, i.e. ∆v = 0 to ∆vmax, then the spoofing probability changes with the maximum
allowable acceleration, γ. Figure 5.8 represents the spoofing probability of attacker, A1
spoofing verifier V1 when both the velocity and position of A1 varies with respect to the
target velocity and position.
5.5 Value of Spoofing Probability
We have analysed the above methods by first defining a threat model and then finding
out vulnerabilitiees of each infrastructure. These vulnarabilities decide how easy or difficult
it is to attack a given system. We cannot compare two methods as different as distance
bounding and friendly jamming or even methods as similar as distance bounding and tri-
lateration unless we assign a measure to the vulnerability of each method to a particular
threat model. The idea of probability of an attacker spoofing an arbitaray point, randomly
selected along the highway, is the simplest way to find the vulnerability of the infrastructure
at that point. Calculating the probability at all such points gives us an overall idea of how
effective the localization method is for the defined threat model. Spoofing probability is
essentially a measurement to be considered during system development. According to an
article by National Institute of Standards and Measurements (NIST), in the various mea-
surements carried out during system development, the measurement of spoofing probability
fits in with the measurement carried out in the implementation assessment phase [54]. The
value of measurements like spoofing probability, according to the article by NIST, lies in
these points.
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I : Provides insights into the risk of the system being exploited when implemented.
II : Indicates need for additional security controls in operations.
Fig. 5.3: Spoofing probability with ∆v = 0 and constant target velocities (v0) for the
verifier, V1 by a single attacker, as a function of the position of the targeted vehicle as it
travels along a verification unit.
Fig. 5.4: Spoofing probability with ∆v = 0 and constant target velocities (v0) for the
verifier, V2 by a single attacker, as a function of the position of the targeted vehicle as it
travels along a verification unit.
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Fig. 5.5: Spoofing probability with ∆v = 0 and constant target velocities (v0) for a verifi-
cation unit in the friendly jamming infrastructure by a single attacker, as a function of the
position of the targeted vehicle as it travels along a verification unit.
Fig. 5.6: Spoofing probability with ∆v = 0 and constant target velocities (v0) for the
verifier, V2 by a second attacker, colluding with an attacker targeting the verifier, V1 as a
function of the position of the targeted vehicle as it travels along a verification unit.
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Fig. 5.7: Spoofing probability with ∆v = 0 and constant target velocities (v0) for a verifi-
cation unit in the friendly jamming infrastructure by two colluding attackers, as a function
of the position of the targeted vehicle as it travels along a verification unit.
Fig. 5.8: Spoofing probability with ∆v = 0 to ∆vmax and target velocity, v0 = 36 kmph for
the verifier, V1 by a single attacker, as a function of ∆v and the position of the targeted
vehicle as it travels along a verification unit.
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Chapter 6
Results and Conclusion
We plotted the spoofing probabilities for distance bounding, trilateration and friendly
jamming. The results are summarized in Figure 6.1. We observe that, in case of distance
bounding, adding more verifiers (trilateration needs three verifiers as opposed to simple
distance bounding), the reduces the spoofing probability. However, the expected distance,
i.e. mean of all the distances available for spoofing remains the same. Also, the standard
deviation (SD), i.e. the average of the square of differences between mean and available
distances does not change. Ninety-five percent of the most vulnerable positions lie within
the range given by mean ± 1.96SD. Thus, we can determine a range of positions which
are more vulnerable compared to other positions along the highway. And this gives us the
opportunity to monitor those regions to detect attacks.
Fig. 6.1: Comparison of distance bounding, trilateration, and friendly jamming.
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Figure 6.2 shows the spoofing probability and vulnerable positions when both the
velocity and position of the attacker is considered to differ from the target velocity and
position. We consider different allowable acceleration limits, i.e. γ = 1m/s2, 5m/s2 and
10m/s2. Apart from the differences in spoofing probability, there are some basic differences
between distance bounding, trilateration, and friendly jamming. Figure 6.3 gives a brief
comparison of other aspects of the three localization methods.
6.1 Advantages and Drawbacks of the Friendly Jamming Method
The major advantage of friendly jamming is that the spoofing probability depends not
only on the target position, but also the target velocity. In other words, to be able to defeat
Fig. 6.2: Friendly jamming with velocity and position of the attacker different from the
target velocity and position.
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Fig. 6.3: Summary of distance bounding, trilateration, and friendly jamming.
the verification method, the attackers will have to consider the target PV information and
not just the position information (P). The attacker will need fast computing hardware in
order to get more information about the spoofing probability at that time instant. Also,
it is much more difficult to synchromize both position and velocity (that ∆x and ∆v are
within favorable limits for the attacker), than to station oneself in a favorable position in
case of distance bounding and trilateration. We observe that due to these restrictions, the
spoofing probability for friendly jamming is much less than those of distance bounding.
When the distance between adjacent verifiers is 100 meters, friendly jamming achieves a
spoofing probability of less than 2%. The equivalent spoofing probabilities for distance
bounding is 25% and trilateration is 11%.
A drawback of friendly jamming is because of its large standard deviation of the po-
sitions most vulnerable to spoofing. The standard deviation of a probability distribution
which decreases slowly on moving away from the mean, would be higher as compared to that
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of a probability distribution which decreases rapidly on moving away from the mean. The
spoofing probability in case of friendly jamming is more uniform throughout the verification
segment, even though is much lesser than that of distance bounding and trilateration. It is
to be noted that no localization algorithm can be 100% secure. There are certain attacker
configurations for which a position can be certainly spoofed, i.e. the spoofing probability is
1. This is also true with friendly jamming.
6.2 Future Scope
As the currently defined infrastructure using friendly jamming is vulnerable over a large
range of distances, there is scope for defining an infrastructure which is more robust in terms
of the range of spoofable distances. By modifying the friendly jamming algorithm, we can
attempt to improve the spoofing probability and its probability distribution further. We can
also compare friendly jamming with other localization methods used in ATS. Currently, we
have presented the analysis with a single-lane highway. There is scope for further analysis
with multiple-lane highways and how the results differ from the current results. Also, our
current analysis gives us the spoofing probability when the attacker’s position is unknown,
i.e. an attacker can be at any arbitrary position along the highway. If we possess the
knowledge of an attacker’s position, we can find the spoofing probability for that particular
configuration of attackers. For certain configurations, the spoofing probability is 1. We can
find such configurations and explore an extension of the friendly jamming method to lower
this probability (for example, by adding more verifiers or through continuous monitoring).
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